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Abstract This article argues that intuition is a crucial component of professional
competence, and provides empirical evidence to support this claim. It was found that
in most cases intuitive predictions of stock market development are better than
rationally justified ones and that experts predict more precisely than novices on a
descriptive data level. The discussion links these findings to the literature about
expertise and intuition. Research on professional expertise theoretically indicates
intuition as a crucial component of that expertise. This article focuses on the exercise
of intuition in the domain of investment. Stock market investment decisions rely on
forecasts of market development. As complete information is not available, entirely
rational decisions cannot be made, and it becomes necessary to rely on intuition. An
overview of theories on intuition are presented followed by discussion of an
empirical study in which 32 persons of varying experience in the stock market used
intuition as well as rational justifications to predict stock rates.
Keywords Decision making . Expertise . Intuition . Rationality .
Stock market forecast
Intuition and Professional Practice
Intuition refers to the domain-specific capability to reach an appropriate decision
without deliberately balancing various alternatives and without reflecting on a task
(Myers 2002). Intuition makes use of knowledge-resources secured through
individuals’ professional experiences, but of which they may not be necessarily
aware. This intuition is held to give experts advantage over persons who do not act
intuitively (Hogarth 2001). One domain through which intuition can be investigated
is its role as a component of professional performance in the stock market
forecasting. A typical task in the domain of investment is to forecast developments
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on the stock market. Even though it is a daily task of investment professionals, it can
be done in different ways, depending on time pressure and on the need to rationally
defend one’s decisions. In consequence, there is ample variance of individual
experiences and of the degree of conscious assumptions. Stock markets are an
important area of the economy and of management. Stock prices represent the
anticipated economic achievement potential of a listed enterprise. It is an important
question whether effective forecasting economic development is an area of
rationality or intuition. Thus, forecasting tasks are appropriate means to investigate
intuition (Klein 2003). The idea of rational decision-making as a decisive modality
of management has a long tradition in theories of management and business (Hitt
et al. 2005). However, during recent years, increased interest has been directed
towards intuition as an effective modality of management (e.g. Robbins 2005).
The Role of Intuition in the Field of Economy
Frantz (2005), when analyzing the history of economic thought since Adam Smith,
showed that intuition plays a role in the range of economic theories. Indeed, it seems
to be a misconception that management and business decisions are completely based
on rational choices. Full rationality in decision making requires unlimited cognitive
resources and capabilities (Selten 2002). As human knowledge processing is quite
limited (e.g., human short-term memory processes an average of 7±2 information
units [Miller 1956]), it is acknowledged that managers cannot consider all
dimensions, facets and details of a given complex problem. Despite these
restrictions, managers are able to reasonably and successfully solve complex
business problems. They operate within the restrictions of bounded rationality, a
model developed by Simon (1957). He described decision making as a process that
seeks an appropriate, but not necessarily optimal, solution to a problem. The
appropriateness of a solution results from the goal variable (i.e. to win a chess
match) to be achieved. The process of searching for a solution stops when the goal
variable is reached. Simon (1957) calls this solution a “satisfycing” solution, which
is a combination of satisfying and sufficiency.
Evidence exists that relying on intuition can improve decision making under the
constraints of bounded rationality. Intuitive decision making is defined as “the
primarily subconscious process of identifying a decision and selecting a preferred
alternative” (Hitt et al. 2005, 311). Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) describe managers’
core competence as the ability to cope with surprising, unexpected and new
challenges. The crucial capabilities they detected are, first, the grasp for danger or
critical development in a very early stage, and, second, the capability to decide
intuitively in an appropriate way to stop a danger development. A study of managers
in small- and medium-sized companies found a positive correlation between
managers’ intuitive decision style and their enterprises’ economic financial and
non-financial performance (Sadler-Smith 2004). This study reflects the findings of
similar studies conducted by Agor (1986), Andersen (2000), Isenberg (2001), Khatri
and Ng (2000) or Westcott (1968), which all identified positive correlations between
intuitive decision tendencies and performance. Similarly, Davis and Davis (2003)
investigated school principals in California and also confirmed the importance and
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efficiency of intuitive decision making in management. This suggests that intuition is
perhaps a broadly based capacity that can be deployed in a range of fields of human
activity. These studies reported a saving of time and cognitive resources as the most
important advantage of intuitive decisions. Thus, quick reactions are possible and
resources remain available for other important management activities. So, the
development of intuition is of importance to understanding what constitutes effective
work performance.
Cognitive Background: The Two Systems Theory of Information Processing
In their early work, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) investigated the phenomenon
that people estimate things badly in areas where they are usually considered to be
competent. These authors subsequently developed the theory of two parallel
operating systems of information processing (Sloman 2002), which is widely
applied in business and managerial decision-making research (e.g. Dane and Pratt
2007; Sadler-Smith and Shefy 2004). Referring to the theory’s assumption, that
individuals’ engage in different working modes, various approaches of decision-
making research proposed that there are two parallel and permanent operating
information processing systems (Bruner 1962; Hogarth 2005; Kahneman and
Frederick 2002; Sloman 2002). Although they use different terminologies, these
approaches agree in principle with the comparison of a mode operating deliberately,
rationally and analytically with a mode working associatively, intuitively and tacitly.
Hammond (1993) claims that these two operation modes can be located at a
continuum of consciousness: the intuitive mode is on the unconscious side of the
continuum, and the rational mode is on the conscious one. The border between these
two modes exercises variably on the continuum between the two poles. That means
that intuitive decisions can be conscious (i.e., if somebody follows a gut feeling) and
rational decisions can be partly unconscious (e.g., if somebody follows a given
order) (Gladwell 2005).
Importantly, the concept “that two independent systems are at work depends
critically on the fact that the perception and the knowledge are maintained
simultaneously” (Sloman 2002, p. 385). For instance, when observing pictures with
pretend lines of differing length only on the basis of three-dimensional illusions,
subjects show a compulsion to agree that the presented lines are of similar length but
simultaneously try to find reasons for the perception of differing lengths. Similar
simultaneous beliefs of contradicting statements could be observed in arguing or
concluding with probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1983).
Opinions differ as to how the intuitive and the rational thinking modes influence
human behaviour. In one direction, evidence suggests that the rational system can
overrule the intuitive system in the case of ex-post reflecting of failing actions
(Epstein et al. 1992). Conversely, Sloman (2002) argued that in each rational
decision, intuitive shares appear because the intuitive system works associative and,
thus, quicker than each rational consideration. Hence, intuitive traces influences
(even) perception, and, by that, every decision that is independent of the mode.
Allinson and Hayes (1996) developed a questionnaire that identifies a general
thinking style (Cognitive Style Index). Such a perspective assumes a general
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preference for either intuitive or rational decision making. More test inventories exist
following a similar idea: Epstein et al. (1996) and their REI-questionnaire, Agor’s
AIM (1984), and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (Briggs and Myers 1976). These
instruments were applied in several studies that investigated the advantage of
intuitive thinking styles in management (Agor 1986; Davis and Davis 2003; Sadler-
Smith 2004). Even if these studies proved the effectiveness of an intuitive thinking
style, the knowledge base of intuition must still be explained and considered in
accounts of expertise.
Intuition and Expertise
Research on expertise usually describes the development of individual knowledge
structures during the progress from novice to expert. This approach derives from
studies of chess that investigated the role of memory for extraordinary performances
of perception and recognition (Chase and Simon 1973a, b). Findings suggested that
decision-making behaviour, in reality, is not always completely rational (Simon
1955), and experts have recognized patterns in complex arrangements that enable
them to respond spontaneously. On this basis, the idea of intuition as recognition
became established (de Groot 1986). Indeed, in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) five-
step model for the development of expertise, the highest level of expertise is that of
intuitive action, which does not demand concentration, reflection or awareness.
Their theory indicated that intuition uses rich knowledge of which people are no
longer aware. This is sometimes referred to as tacit knowledge (Reber 1993).
However, this knowledge developed by experience and eventually by enculturation
in a professional domain. A well-known example they quoted is of chicken sexers
who work at chicken farms and who are able to distinguish male and female
chickens that are only a few days old when rational descriptions fail. This profession
was imported from Japan, where there is a long tradition of chicken sexing, and an
apprenticeship program that focuses on the long process of implicit learning by
doing and enculturation, and by referring to the Zen philosophy (Lunn 1948).
Qualified sexers can identify the gender of 2,000 chickens in one hour with 98
percent accuracy (Biederman and Shiffar 1987), but they are unable to report on
their decision ratio, as they are just doing it (Schroeder 1933) intuitively (Dreyfus
and Dreyfus 1986).
Eraut (1994) in reviewing research on professional expertise noted that the
developed structures of explicable (i.e. declarative and procedural) knowledge only
describe one (important) aspect of professional performance, but that intuition is an
important supplement. He defined intuition as “not only pattern recognition but also
rapid responses to developing situations…based on the tacit application of tacit
rules. These rules may not be explicit or capable of reasoned justification, but their
distinctive feature is that of being tacit at the moment of use” (Eraut 2000, p. 127).
Intuition in this way may permit heuristics to be rapidly deployed, and likely arises
through the merging of complex knowledge patterns, developed during learning
(Reber 1993) or by the automation and development of routines (Eraut 1994). The
ACT*-theory (Anderson 1982, 1990) claims tuning and modification as models for
cognitive processes underlying the transition from explicit to implicit knowledge, in
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ways that are analogous to descriptions of intuition. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)
described the processes of internalization as a way of tacitly transforming explicable
knowledge and enculturation as a way of mediating implicit knowledge in the
context of the professional working life.
Klein (2003) discussed the effect of mental models and pattern recognition when
he tried to explain professionals’ capacities to make appropriate decisions under
constraints. These mental models and patterns are a result of mental simulations of
action scripts that professionals experience in their career. If a simulation results
positively, a mental model develops that can guide future fast decisions. It seems that
intuition “is based on extensive experience both in analysis and problem solving and
in implementation and to the extent that the lessons of experience are logical and
well-founded, then so is the intuition” (p. 19). Baron and Ensley (2006)
demonstrated how experienced entrepreneurs outclass novices in identifying
potential business opportunities. This is due to a personal cognitive framework that
was developed through individuals’ experience, which facilitates spontaneous
pattern recognition – the basis of intuitive decision making.
In this way, construing intuition as a component of expertise implies a
development theory for the capability of intuitive decision making. Hence, the
expertise approach offers a learning perspective on intuition: Intuition is grounded
on knowledge that is developed by explicit and implicit processes of professional
learning (Gladwell 2005; Klein 2003; Myers 2002), but not on innate capabilities.
Thus, expertise is an educational account of intuition.
Intuition and the Stock Market
Although decisions for investment in certain stocks might be proposed as a rational
process, the prerequisites for a rational choice situation are compromised because
objective and complete information is not always available e.g. on the future
development. Additionally, several alternatives may offer similar conditions that
make a rationally informed decision impossible. Hence, intuition becomes relevant
for stock market decisions.
A typical task for stock brokers involves forecasting economic developments. On
the one hand, customers must be consulted about ways to invest money; on the other
hand, the profitability of a financial institution depends on the quality of its own
investment predictions and decisions. A decision to buy stocks depends on
predictions of the likely economic success of an enterprise. Thus, assumptions
referring to a single enterprise must be formulated, as well as estimations on entire
business sectors. Certainly, some objective information exists on enterprises and
market competition. Of course, one can expect that professionals in this field have
gained experience from many market observations over a number of years. However,
there is simply not enough information to create an accurate forecast. Thus, the
ability to use intuition to make an appropriate decision is very important because the
possibility to reach a solution through wholly means is limited. Some even hold that
rational decision-making can be seen as obstacles that overlap with implicit
heuristics that have been learned and created through years of experience (Reber
1993). Explicit knowledge, which rational considerations refer to, and implicit
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knowledge, which intuitive decisions refer to are different cognitive modalities. The
latter is not necessarily approachable by consciousness. Thus, rational considerations
overshadow intuitive ones, as soon as a person’s attention is focused on rationality
(Bastick 2003; Dienes and Perner 2002).
As foreshadowed, someone who is forced to deliver a rational justification for a
forecast is predicted to perform worse than somebody who is free from these constraints
(Kahneman and Frederick 2002). This is because of the lack of information, which is
an unchangeable feature of a forecast. The force to justify a forecast rationally affects
conservative and careful forecasts, which can be referred to as explicit knowledge. Yet,
the lack of a need for justification does not place the priority on rational considerations
because it allows the usage of implicit knowledge. Thus, intuitive forecasts are
supposed to be more accurate – measured through the final and effective development
of the concerned values – than forecasts that have to be justified rationally. From a
theoretical viewpoint, the following two research questions result:
1. Are intuitive forecasts better than rationally justified ones, both referring to
single stocks and to aggregate values (e.g., DAX – the German stock market
index)? The distinction between single and aggregate values makes sense,
because single values can be influenced by singular events to a higher extent
than aggregated values. Aggregate values can be seen as cumulated economic
quantity.
2. Do experts and novices differ in the quality of their intuitive and rationally
justified forecasts? As stock market forecasts were characterised as an issue of
expertise, differences between experts and novices should be observable.
Method
Design and Sample
Two groups (n=16 each) of subjects were compared, differing in the “level of
expertise” (experts, novices). The groups were defined as a split-half of a sample of
32 subjects dealing with stock market issues. The split between the groups was
based on the years of experience on the stock market, as a device to compare the two
groups, as much literature refers to differences between more or less expert workers.
The group of novices were those subjects with up to 4 years of experience; experts
were those with 4 to 20 years of experience. All members of the expert group were
drawn from professionals in the bank or investment domain. All subjects had to give
both intuitive and rationally justified forecasts. In total, N=32 persons (23 men and 9
women) participated voluntarily by responding to an invitation. All the female
participants belonged to the group of novices. Some subjects did not answer certain
questions on the questionnaire, so some calculations have different sample sizes.
Instrument and Procedure
In an online questionnaire, subjects forecasted the development of five important
German stock market values nine months in advance: DAX, Allianz, DaimlerChrysler,
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Infineon Technologies, Karstadt Quelle. Additionally, the subjects forecasted the price
of fuel (i.e. regular unleaded) and the exchange rate of € vs US$. All values were
forecasted in Euros except the DAX,which was scaled in index points, and the exchange
rate of the US$, which was indicated as the price for 1€ in US$. The subjects were to put
the expected number in an input mask. For each intuitive forecast, the answering time
was limited to 15 s, which generated considerable time pressure. For rationally justified
forecasts, no time limit was set, and subjects explicitly had to write down rational
justifications for their decisions. This follows the basic assumption of this study: if
subjects are forced to justify forecasts rationally, intuitive ideas are suppressed. Under
time pressure, however, intuitive forecasts are forced.
Randomized test sequences guaranteed that intuitive and rationally justified
forecasts were equally distributed in the sample, except for the DAX forecast, which
had to be forecasted, at first, intuitively and, at the end of the questionnaire,
rationally justified by all subjects. Due to the time pressure for intuitive forecasts, the
reaction time was tested at the end of the questionnaire in order to control possible
influences of reaction time on the quality of the forecasts. That means that for the
DAX, a within-subject design with repeated measures was realised; for all other
values the study covered a between-subject design.
All subjects had to respond to a reaction test, which consisted of reading
information on the monitor and delivering an input to the computer. Time was
measured from the delivery of the information until the complete input of an answer.
The purpose of this reaction test is to control this variable, because intuitive forecasts
had to be done under considerable time pressure, which is advantageous to people
with quick reactions compared to slow subjects.
The quality of the forecasts was estimated by comparison with the effective stock
prices nine months later. The less the forecasts differed from the effective price, the
higher the quality of the forecasts. Differences between forecasts and effective prices
were further analysed.
Analyses
Data analysis commenced with the calculation of the differences between forecasted
and effective stock prices and their descriptive statistics. The research questions were
answered by analyses of variance (t-test, ANOVA) and correlation analyses
(Pearson). Effect sizes were calculated for each test.
Results
Table 1 shows the stock prices at the beginning and at the end of the study. The
‘beginning’ column contains the prices at the time when the experiment started. The
‘end’ column shows the prices at the time which has to be predicted (i.e. 9 months
later). The selected economic indicators performed different during that period. The
value of four indicators increased, two decreased, and one ended at the same price as
it had at the beginning of the experiment.
All analyses refer to the difference between the forecasts and the effective value at
the end of the study. Table 2 documents the accuracy of the forecasts (i.e., the
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difference between predicted value and effective stock rate nine months later), both
for rationally justified and intuitive forecasts. Positive means indicate that the
forecast was above the effective value; negative means indicate that the effective
value was higher than forecasted. In four cases, the mean accuracy of intuitive
forecasts was higher than of the rational forecasts, in two cases the rational forecasts
were more accurate in average.
Before focusing on intuitive and rationally justified forecasts, the influence of
reaction time is analysed in order to control a possible influence of reaction time on
the forecast accuracy. Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between forecast
accuracy and subjects’ reaction time. No significant correlation could be found. This
indicates that the forecast accuracy was independent from subjects’ speed of
responding to an input mask which has been an important feature of the experiment.
Forecast accuracy was checked for group differences between rationally justified
and intuitive forecasts by two-sided t-tests. In the case for the DAX value, which
was measured for each subject repeatedly, a t-test for dependent samples was
calculated. In all other cases, a t-test for independent samples was calculated (see
Table 4), because the subject made – following a system internal random generator –
either an intuitive or a rationally justified forecast. For significant differences, the
effect size d was calculated. Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2.
The differing degrees of freedom result from subjects omitting some questions.
In both cases of significant differences, the intuitive forecasts were closer to the
effective price than the rationally justified ones. Finally, Table 5 shows the
comparison of experts and novices and the results of a 2×2 factorial analysis of
variance (data shown only for main effect “level of expertise”). The only significant
difference between experts and novices was found at the forecast of the Allianz
stock, which was predicted more accurate by experts.
Table 2 Accuracy of rational and intuitive forecasts measured as difference from effective stock price.
Means and standard deviations
Value Mean difference/SD rational
forecasts
Mean difference/SD intuitive
forecasts
DAX −1,086.87/916.19 (n=32) −939.01/832.99 (n=32)
Allianz −26.30 /9.56 (n=18) −25.17/9.14 (n=13)
DaimlerChrysler −8.62/3.88 (n=17) −8.55/4.13 (n=14)
Infineon Technologies +0.31/1.44 (n=14) +0.57/2.17 (n=17)
Karstadt Quelle −2.18/2.61 (n=13) −3.11/2.84 (n=17)
Fuel +0.02/0.11 (n=14) +0.02/0.17 (n=16)
Exchange rate 1 € vs. US $ +0.14/0.09 (n=16) −0.01/0.10 (n=15)
Value Beginning End
DAX 4,256.08 pts 5,282.13 pts
Allianz 97.15 € 125.25 €
DaimlerChrysler 35.25 € 43.24 €
Infineon Technologies 7.91 € 7.82 €
Karstadt Quelle 7.60 € 11.70 €
Fuel 1.219 € 1.219 €
Exchange rate 1 € vs. US $ 1.3646 US $ 1.1801 US $
Table 1 Stock prices at the
beginning at the end of
the study
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Discussion
The discussion focuses on methodological aspects of the study and relates the
findings with the context of the literature on expertise and intuition.
Question 1: Are Intuitive Forecasts Better than Rationally Justified Ones?
From a theoretical standpoint, intuition was found to enhance the quality of forecasts
on the stock market. For the empirical design, a procedure was selected that tends to
exclude rational considerations from intuitive forecasts by implementing time
pressure. This is a typical strategy for investigating intuitive decisions (Wahl 1990).
Intuitive forecasts are supposed to be better than the rational ones because
substantial information for providing correct forecasts is missing. Thus, rational
considerations, which tend to balance different positions and options, are supposed
to be more biased than intuitive forecasts. During the measures, each forecast that
had to be justified rationally, started with a presentation of basic information. This
information consisted of a chart illustrating a 12-month market history.
All subjects had to provide an intuitive and a rationally justified forecast of the
most important aggregated stock value: the German stock index DAX. As Table 2
shows, the intuitive forecasts were better than the rationally justified ones in most
cases. So far, the theoretical assumption was confirmed. However, this finding can
be discussed critically when considering the gap between the forecasts and the
effective DAX value. The average forecasts were 4,195.13 (rationally justified) and
4,342.99 (intuitive), whereas the effective value reached 5,282 index points. Both,
rationally justified decisions and intuitive decisions substantially differed from the
“true” score (21 and 18%, respectively).
Value r (reaction time)
DAX intuitive −0.29
DAX rationale −0.28
Allianz 0.09
DaimlerChrysler −0.03
Infineon Techn. 0.05
Karstadt Quelle −0.08
Fuel 0.19
Exchange rate 1 € vs US $ 0.26
Table 3 Pearson correlation
between forecast accuracy
and reaction time
df=31
*p<.05
Value t-test t significance Df D
DAXa −2.10 p<0.05 31 −0.52
Allianz <1 n.s. 28
DaimlerChrysler <1 n.s. 29
Infineon Technologies <1 n.s. 29
Karstadt Quelle <1 n.s. 29
Fuel <1 n.s. 28
Exchange rate 1 € vs. US $ 4.51 p<.001 29 1.62
Table 4 Test of differences
between rational and intuitive
forecasts
Two sided t-test for a dependent
and independent samples
n.s Not significant,
d Cohen’s d
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These differences can be interpreted as indicators of the bad quality of forecasting
in general. However, the judgement of the quality criteria for the forecasts averts the
issue that intuition is a component of professional competence, because it is at best
an economic debate. Objective information was not available for the forecast. The
purpose of this study was to investigate differences between intuitive and rationally
justified forecasts.
Alternatively, the results can be read in a way that rational considerations suggested a
careful prediction, which is evident when regarding the development of the DAX the
year before the study took place. In relation to that period, the increase of the DAX
during the experimental period is extraordinary – even if the later development of the
DAX remained at such a level of increase. Thus, the difference between the forecasts
and the effective rate was highly influenced by accidental incidents in the experimental
period. More interesting for this study is the difference between intuitive and rationally-
justified forecasts, which remains independent from accidental influences. Wide
information was presented to the subjects before they made their rationally justified
DAX forecast. There is evidence that the presentation of data material influences
estimations by defining a reference class (Gigerenzer et al. 1997), so the rationally
justified forecasts may be biased in that direction. However, it must be considered that
the intuitive forecast of the DAX was given before the rationally justified one.
For the other forecasts (i.e. Allianz, DaimlerChrysler, Infineon Technologies,
Karstadt Quelle, US$, and fuel), subjects had to provide randomly distributed
forecasts that are either intuitive or rationally justified. Whereas Allianz, Daimler-
Chrysler, Infineon Technologies, Karstadt Quelle, and fuel cost are single
economical items, the Euro and the US$ (as currencies) can also be interpreted as
an aggregated economic item. Noteworthy, the intuitive and rationally justified
forecasts of the US$ also differed significantly, and again the intuitive forecasts were
closer to the effective price than the rationally justified ones.
The relative deviations are much lower than in the case of the DAX, which cannot
be explained by the absolute figures (the DAX is a value measured in thousands of
points; exchange rates between currencies are measured in decimal places). The
Table 5 Comparison of experts and novices referring to the quality of their forecasts: Means (SD)
Value Experts novices F (1,29) Significance d
DAX r: −928.56 (679.18) r: −1,245.17 (1,104.55) <1 n.s.
i: −735.62 (282.90) i: −1,142.52 (1,125.01)
Allianz r: −23.61 (8.75) r: −28.70 (10.11) 5.44 p<.05 0.82
i: −20.97 (5.73) i: −31.89 (10.08)
DaimlerChrysler r: −9.10 (3.34) r: −8.29 (4.36) 1.23 n.s.
i: −6.91 (2.74) i: −11.50 (4.85)
Infineon Technologies r: +0.21 (1.31) r: +0.45 (1.71) <1 n.s.
i: +0.77 (1.58) i: +0.39 (2.67)
Karstadt Quelle r: +1.00 (2.25) r: +4.08 (2.05) 3.11 n.s.
i: +2.72 (3.09) i: +3.44 (2.73)
Fuel r: −0.04 (0.10) r: +0.07 (0.10) 1.20 n.s.
i: +0.01 (0.12) i: +0.03 (0.24)
Exchange rate €/$ r: +0.16 (0.10) r: +0.11 (0.08) <1 n.s.
i: −0.08 (0.09) i: +0.03 (0.09)
n.s. Not significant, r rational forecasts, i intuitive forecasts, d Cohen’s d
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rationally justified forecasts differ by 12% from the effective exchange rate; the
intuitive forecasts differ by average of only 1%. Thus, the intuitive dollar forecast
achieved almost perfect accuracy. In the same way, the same questions can be
challenged regarding the explanatory power of figures, which now – in contrast to
the DAX – differ just by decimal places.
Does the difference between intuitive and rationally justified forecasts matter? It
does at least in the way that the differences are statistically significant. The effect
size (Cohen’s d) in the DAX forecast is medium-large (d=0.52); the one in the US$
is very large (d=1.62). Nearly identical intuitive forecasts were responsible, so that
even small sums of differences are significant. It was noted that these above
estimations might be biased through reference classes introduced into the
measurement setting. The exchange rate of the US$ varied within quite a large
range during the year before the study was conducted, but the effective exchange
rate lies on the lower end of the range of this development. If an orientation at the
reference of the presented chart occurred, the rational forecasts should have been in
the upper range, because the dollar was at a higher level for most of the presented
year and – particularly – at the moment of the investigation.
In contrast to DAX and US$, no significant differences between intuitive and
rationally justified forecasts were found for the other predictions, which referred to
single economic items – either corporate or raw material. An explanation is that
aggregated values depend on a more complex and manifold net of influences than
single values. Thus, intuition as capability to come to an appropriate business
decision in opaque or partly unknown solutions (Cappon 1994) has a larger effect on
aggregated values than on single values.
However, even if no significant difference between intuitive and rational forecasts
can be found, some differences in the quality of the forecasts occurred. There are
forecasts to three stock values that show a relatively high difference to the effective
values. The forecasts of Allianz show a distance of 21% (i.e. rational) and 20%
(i.e. intuitive) to the effective market price, similar to the forecasts of DaimlerChrysler
(i.e. both forecasts 20%). Karstadt Quelle ended in differences of 19% (i.e. rational)
and 27% (i.e. intuitive). In contrast, Infineon Technologies was predicted quite well
(i.e. 4% deviance on rational, 7% on intuitive forecasts), and the price of fuel was
predicted almost exactly (i.e. 2% in both kind of forecasts). Possible reasons for these
differences in the prognostic quality can be found in the domain of economy. In the
debate on intuition, the fact remains that on single values there is no significant
difference between intuitive and rational forecasts, except on aggregated values.
Question 2: Do Experts and Novices Differ?
Theories on intuition as a component of professional competence suggest the experts
are superior to novices because of their experience and their relevant implicit and
explicit knowledge (Reber 1993). As the results show, in most cases there is no
significant difference between experts’ and novices’ accuracy (see Table 5). The
only exception is the Allianz value forecast, which the experts predicted with
significantly more accuracy. Notably, the experts’ forecasts were more accurate
when they were intuitive than when they were rational, whereas the novices
achieved a better result with rational predictions. However, the experts’ predictions
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were both closer to the effective Allianz stock price than the novices’ predictions. As
the effect size for the differences between experts and novices is quite high (d=
0.82), one can conclude from the findings for this one stock value that the
differences in quality in the forecasts are a result of the expertise factor.
For further discussion of the differences between experts and novices, the focus
needs to address descriptive results. In total, seven economic items had to be
predicted. For each item, rational as well as intuitive predictions had to be made.
Table 5 clearly shows that in 10 of the 14 forecasts, the experts were more accurate
than the novices in forecasting effective values.
Striking results referring the two aggregated values could not be found here. The
first aggregated value, the DAX, was forecasted more precisely by the experts in
both kinds of prediction, whereas the US$ was better predicted by the novices in
both forecasts. Whilst intuitive and rational forecast of aggregated values
significantly differed, the experts could not attain considerable advantage of their
superior knowledge and experience for their forecasts of DAX and US$. As
discussed above, the accuracy of the forecasts for the exchange rate between € and
US$ reached a very high level, especially the intuitive forecasts. Thus, the difference
between experts and novices referring to their rational and intuitive US$ forecasts
may be neglected even on a descriptive data level.
The fact that experts and novices did not significantly differ supports the theory of
intuition, because it constructs intuition as a thinking style that is not necessarily
connected to experience alone (Allinson and Hayes 1996). However, even if there is
some evidence that the tendency of deciding intuitively might also be connected to
personal traits, it is quite difficult to explain why domain knowledge developed
during the professional career or experience on stock market observation should not
impact intuitive decisions. Even if stable personal traits – for instance risk-taking
readiness or tolerance of ambiguity – influence the tendency to intuitively decide (or
rationally), differences in the knowledge base between experts and novices influence
the tendency (and probably also the outcome) of decision making. Apart from this, it
is a fundamental question whether decision-making tendencies and thinking styles
generally can be interpreted independently from concrete situations and, therefore,
domains.
Within the investigation, time pressure was supposed to force intuitive forecasts
by excluding rational considerations as much as possible. That means that those
subjects who were slower at processing the questions were possibly at a
disadvantage in this study. A reaction test, which measured the time between
presentation of information and the input of a complete answer, aimed to determine
whether the intuitive forecasts demanded too much. No significant correlation
between reaction time and the accuracy of forecasts was found.
Conclusion
The relevance of intuition for management theories and decision making in the
domain of the stock market was proposed here. Customers expect that professionals
in bank institutions or investment consultancies can rely on a huge stock of implicit
and explicit knowledge and, thus, that professionals in this domain do not decide
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accidentally when giving advice to their customers. Investment advice is always
connected to (perhaps implicit) forecasts of market development. However, market
forecasts cannot refer to complete information, because there is always some crucial
information missing that is necessary to determine factors objectively. Thus,
intuition is an important component of professional competence in the domain of
stock market because it allows individuals to act appropriately in situations when
they lack information.
The central assumption was set that intuition promotes the quality of forecasts on
the stock market. The empirical findings partly confirm this assumption for aggregated
stock values. In these cases, the intuitive forecasts were significantly closer to the
effective values than the rationally justified forecasts. In fact, the US$ was intuitively
predicted with almost perfect accuracy. Similar results were not found for single stock
values. This may be because single values are subject to singular irregular influences
more than aggregated values. However, the selection of the involved stocks included
large companies, which are less susceptible to accidental incidents and enterprises
from different market areas in order to cover a wide market.
It is interesting that experts and novices did not perform on different quality
levels. However, it has to be considered that the number of participants was quite
low. Thus, conclusions can be drawn carefully only. There were arguments that this
suggests intuition is a personal trait. It would be promising to replicate the study
with larger differences in experience between novices and experts. Another
possibility is to recruit subjects not (only) from bank institutes, which have a
variety of professional tasks, but from a fund society for the expert group.
By choosing the stock market as a setting for research into intuition in the open-
result manner of a forecast study, this exercise led to interesting insights. Many
influences might affect the effective result of such a study. Some of them may be
accidental; some of them may come from contexts that are not related with intuition.
However, all these influences affect the size of deviation from effective values.
Differences between intuitive and rationally justified forecasts, however, were
independent from those influences. It seems worthwhile to conduct replication
studies in order to check the reliability of this study and to exclude other potential
influences. The next step of research should focus on how intuition as a component
of professional competence develops along an occupational career. Such research
could enhance understanding in the field of professional learning. This contribution
emphasizes the importance of intuition as component of professional competence
from a theoretical perspective and the study provides empirical evidence.
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